Although tort liability is supposed to encourage health care providers to reduce the risk of patient injuries, medical malpractice insurance is thought to dampen this deterrent effect by insulating physicians from the costs of claims. The degree to which malpractice insurance protects physicians from these costs has never been quantified, however, and the oft-heard claim that every physician is "one lawsuit away from financial disaster" suggests that doctors face significant exposure in malpractice lawsuits, despite being insured. This study quantifies the frequency with which insured physicians pay out of their own pockets to satisfy malpractice claims. Using Texas Department of Insurance data on closed medical malpractice claims for 1990-2003, we find that claimants frequently received the available primary coverage and rarely recovered more. Physicians almost never used personal assets to cover paid claims. In addition, we find that even though Texas physicians with paid claims purchased less real coverage over time, claim rates and average payments remained relatively stable over the period of study.
costs were transmitted to doctors via the underwriting, pricing and monitoring practices of their insurers.
Using data on 9,525 Texas medical malpractice claims that closed [1990] [1991] [1992] [1993] [1994] [1995] [1996] [1997] [1998] [1999] [2000] [2001] [2002] [2003] with total payments (by all defendants) exceeding $25,000 (nominal), this study finds that physicians rarely paid out of their own pockets to satisfy malpractice claims. Claimants infrequently received more than the primary policy limits, which appear to serve as de facto caps on recoveries. Excluding cases with deductibles and payments by excess carriers, 4 primary carriers resolved 99.4% of paid claims using only their money and provided 98.8% of the total dollars claimants received. Doctors made payments above the policy limits about 4 times per year. Usually, these payments were small, although eight exceeded $500,000, measured in 2003 dollars. 5 Malpractice lawsuits rarely threaten physicians with ruinous personal exposure.
This study also calls into question the conventional wisdom that most doctors carry $1 million (nominal) in coverage. Only about one-third of physicians with paid claims purchased policies of this size. Policies with limits of $100,000, $200,000, and $500,000 were collectively more common. Measured in real dollars, doctors with paid malpractice claims also carried considerably less insurance over time. We find a 31.4% decline in purchased coverage from 1988 to 1999. Because policy limits effectively cap patients' recoveries, this trend toward smaller real policies may eventually cause claim 4 Physicians sometimes purchase additional insurance from excess carriers to protect themselves against exposure to payments in excess of primary policy limits. 5 Interestingly, four of these eight payments were made in perinatal cases. In four of the cases primary limits were $500,000 or less (nominal). Also, in four cases the primary insurer paid less than the limit, suggesting that the physician had eroded the annual aggregate limit. In two of the cases large verdicts were awarded ($3.5M and $4.2M (nominal)). None of the eight physicians retained personal counsel.
rates and payments to claimants to decline. Claim rates and real payments, however, remained fairly stable during the period of study.
This article proceeds as follows. Part II describes the data, provides summary statistics and details specific limitations of the study. Part III provides results related to the relationship between policy limits and recoveries, the allocation of payments between physicians and their insurers, and changes over time in coverage for physicians with paid claims and payments to claimants. 6 Part IV offers a discussion of the results, and Part V concludes.
II. THE DATA A. The Texas Closed-Claims Database
Texas provides a nearly ideal setting to study malpractice litigation. It is the country's second most populous state. It spends the third largest amount on health care.
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It has a large and growing physician population 8 and a highly developed trial bar. 9 It experiences soft and hard insurance markets, and was especially hard-hit by skyrocketing medical malpractice insurance premiums during the recent malpractice "crisis." 10 It enacted sweeping tort reform legislation in 2003, but, with exceptions noted below, had a generally stable legal environment during the period studied here.
11 6 We also examined trends in deductibles and payments by excess insurers. The results relating to these subjects are available on request. 7 Reports of claims with total payments of $25,000 or more identify the policyholder's business class, cause of injury, and type of insurance coverage. This study uses only claims in which (1) the policyholder is a physician, (2) the cause of injury is surgical or medical care, and (3) a medical malpractice policy provided coverage. 16 The first constraint excludes health care providers like hospitals and nursing homes, the insuring habits, litigation practices, and experiences of which might differ from 12 According to the Closed Claim Reporting Guide: "Each insurance company or other entity admitted to do business and authorized to write liability insurance in Texas, including county mutual insurance companies, Lloyd's plan companies, and reciprocal or inter-insurance exchanges, … and each pool, joint underwriting association, or self-insurance mechanism or trust authorized by law to insure its participants, subscribers, or members against liability must submit quarterly closed claim report forms." 13 A "claim" is a report of a final payment (or a promise thereof when defendants will make payments over multiple years) to a patient (or a patient's estate or survivors, when a patient is deceased). The dataset used in this study excludes instances in which carriers opened files and closed them without making payments, e.g., because patients failed to pursue their claims. 14 Medical malpractice cases often involve multiple defendants and multiple insurers. When plaintiffs collect payments from multiple insurers, more than one observation in the dataset will be associated with the particular claim. We refer to these related observations as duplicates. physicians'. The second and third constraints eliminate claims that might involve allegations other than medical malpractice.
As mentioned, the TCCD contains information about the cause of injury only for claims with total payments by all defendants above $25,000 (nominal). Claims with total payments below this level are included in the TCCD but lack information about injury cause and are excluded from the subset of the data we examine. In robustness checks, the results reported below varied little when run on a larger dataset including claims with payments of $10,001-$25,000 (nominal). 17 Some reports of claims with total payments by all defendants above $25,000 (nominal) contain information about payments below $25,000 (nominal) by individual physicians. The dataset includes these reports.
TDI has never adjusted the $25,000 reporting threshold for inflation. Counting claims above the reporting threshold without adjusting for inflation would convey misleading information about frequencies and payments. We address this problem of "bracket creep" by including in our analysis only claims with total payments of $25,000 or more measured in 1988 dollars. 18 The adjustment eliminated 572 claims, 6% of the claims but only 1% of dollars paid; the final sample size is 9,525 insured payments on 8,400 distinct claims. After refining the dataset, we converted our real dollar findings to 2003 dollars when making cross-year comparisons.
To determine the total payment for a particular physician, we summed the deductible payment, the primary carrier's payment, the excess carrier's payment, and the physician's payment above the primary policy limit. Table 2 provides additional summary statistics by closing year on general indices, payments on liability claims, and policy limits covering closed claims.
C. Data Limitations
The methods by which TDI collects policy characteristics and claim information create particular data limitations for our study. In addition, when analyzing the findings one should consider Texas' legal environment.
Policy Characteristics
The method TDI uses to collect information about policy characteristics results in three significant limitations. First, the TCCD does not contain a representative sample of the insured physician population. It over-represents doctors who experienced claims and under-represents doctors who did not. For this reason, the average policy limit reported in the TCCD might be higher or lower than the average limit for all insured Texas physicians. If doctors with paid claims anticipate larger expected losses than other doctors, they might purchase more coverage than physicians in general. 21 Because the TCCD is not a representative sample, one cannot reliably generalize from our findings to the larger population of physicians practicing in Texas. This includes findings about coverage levels and changes in them over time. It would be especially perilous to generalize these findings to physicians practicing elsewhere in the United States. Damages caps, patient compensation funds, lawsuit screening panels, and other variations in tort regimes might affect liability insurance purchasing patterns significantly.
Second, the TCCD does not allow us to determine whether aggregate policy limits were eroded by payments of previous claims on behalf of the insured. The dataset includes the per occurrence limit specified in the insurance contract but not the remaining aggregate coverage. Therefore we cannot identify cases where resolution occurred below the indicated per occurrence limit but at the remaining aggregate limit. 22 This limitation might be problematic because evidence suggests that a few "bad doctors" account for a disproportionate number of paid malpractice claims.
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If payments on behalf of doctors with multiple claims in Texas are commonly constrained by aggregate limits, the impact of policy limits on recoveries will be misestimated. 24 We might also fail to identify the causes of payments by the insured due to an award in excess of policy limits. 25 A payment smaller than the per occurrence limit by a primary carrier combined with a payment by the insured due to an award in excess of the policy limits (or combined with a payment by an excess carrier 26 ) might reflect an exhausted aggregate limit, but could also reflect a deal struck to get a case settled when 22 For example, suppose a physician with policy limits of $100,000 per occurrence and $300,000 aggregate had four claims pending. If three claims settled for a total of $250,000, only $50,000 would remain to cover the fourth. If the plaintiff settled for $50,000, the dataset would record a $50,000 payment and a $100,000 per occurrence policy limit. We have no way of knowing the relationship between the payment and the aggregate limit. 24 See infra Part III for a discussion of the observed relationship between policy limits and payments. 25 Indeed, four of the eight above-limit payments by physicians in excess of $500,000 (measured in 2003 dollars) were made in cases in which the primary insurer made a payment that was below the stated per occurrence limit. 26 An excess carrier provides a layer of coverage above the primary insurance policy which applies when the primary limits are exhausted.
the primary carrier wished to try the case and the insured or excess carrier did not. These cases make up a small fraction of our dataset, however.
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Third, multiple liability policies might cover a single claim, such as when a doctor treats a patient over several years and acts performed in different years trigger different policies. We have not measured the frequency of multiple coverage or its effects.
Claim Information
A prior study sets out the claim-related limitations of the TCCD. 28 We therefore highlight only certain limitations here. First, the TCCD contains information about injury type but not injury severity. Therefore, except when the injury is death, we cannot directly assess the degree of harm patients sustained. Second, the dataset contains no information about the insured's specialty; thus, we cannot directly determine whether our results and reported trends over time are similar across physician specialties. Throughout the study, we attempt to isolate perinatal cases by separately analyzing claims with patients aged 0-1 month at time of injury.
Evidence suggests that plaintiffs sometimes agree to drop doctors from malpractice cases in return for payments from hospitals or other defendants. 29 This strategy spares doctors from having reports filed against them with the National Practitioner Data Bank (NPDB), which began collecting reports of paid malpractice claims against physicians in the early 1990s. Hospitals agree to the strategy to curry favor with physicians, especially those who are sources of lucrative patient referrals. We cannot determine how often this strategy was employed or whether the frequency of its use 27 The data set includes only 112 cases (out of 9,525) of this sort. This is just over 1% of the dataset. 28 See Black et al., supra note _____, at 218-222. 29 [cite] changed over time. Such changes could affect the number of reports in the TCCD as well as doctors' insurance purchases.
Legal Environment
Texas enacted caps on compensatory damages in medical malpractice cases in
1977. As applied to negligence actions, the Texas Supreme Court struck down these caps in 1988. 30 In 1990, the first year for which closed claims are included in this study, the 
III. RESULTS
In this Section we report on the relationship between policy limits and recoveries and the break down of payments by primary insurers and physicians. We find that policy limits seem to cap recoveries and primary insurers make the vast majority of payments to claimants. These findings suggest that the direct deterrent impact of malpractice liability falls upon insurers and is transmitted to physicians, if at all, through insurers' underwriting, pricing, and monitoring practices.
A. Policy Limits Cap Recoveries
To determine the relationship between payment amounts and policy limits, we began by computing payment-to-limit (PTL) ratios for all closed claims. A $500,000 payment on a $1 million policy produces a PTL ratio of 0.5. The ratio equals 1 when the payment equals the primary policy limit. Figure 1 shows the distribution of PTL ratios for all claims and for claims against physicians involved in perinatal cases (i.e., patients aged 0-1 month at time of injury). Note: Each bar represents a 0.05 increment in PTL ratio. All claims with ratios greater than 2 were set equal to 2. Claims with payments by excess carriers are excluded. 36 The percentage of non-perinatal claims with ratios between 0.95 and 1 is 13.6% (n = 1,134). This percentage is statistically significantly lower than the percentage of perinatal claims in this range (z = 7.7; p = 0.00). 37 These figures may understate the spike in payments at available policy limits. When prior payments on behalf of the defendant erode the aggregate annual limit, a payment equal to the remaining coverage will produce an apparent PTL ratio below 1. Only 1.5% of all claims (2.4% of perinatal claims) have PTL ratios > 1. These payments are more frequent when policies are small, occurring in 3.97% of cases with real limits ≤ $250,000. Of 6,332 closed claims with real limits of $500,000 or more, 43 (0.68%) have PTL ratios > 1.
B. Who Pays?
The low frequency of payments in excess of policy limits suggests that primary carriers bear most of the indemnity risk associated with paid malpractice claims. Ignoring deductibles (present in 263 cases), 38 Table 3 shows that almost 98% of claims were resolved with primary carriers' money alone. This includes 101 claims with PTL ratios > 1, the costs of which insurance carriers may have borne to avoid bad faith claims. and excess carriers paid $58.3 million. 38 The mean (median) real deductible was $39,000 ($25,000). Physicians paid deductibles of $100,000 or more (real) in 20 cases, probably pursuant to self-insured retentions. † Includes claims paid using only physician deductible (n = 12) or excess carrier funds and physician deductible (n = 1).
Payments by Primary Carriers
Primary carriers made payments in 9,512 of the 9,525 claims and contributed 97% of all dollars paid. Their payments varied considerably in size. 
Above-Limit Payments by Physicians
Above-limit payments by physicians varied considerably in size. Panel A of Figure 4 shows the distribution of physician above-limit payments in real dollars.
Physicians made above-limit payments in 62 of the 9,525 cases (0.65%). Thirty-eight Number of Payments 0 1,000,000 2,000,000 3, 000,000 4, 000,000
were $100,000 or less; 45 were $200,000 or less. The real mean (median) was $190,000
($54,000) for all claims. A claims-level regression of ln(real above-limit payment) on year found no significant time trend in payment size (estimate=3%; 95% CI=[-6.9% , . The marginal decrease is small, however, because the absolute likelihood is low: for each additional $1,000,000 in real coverage the predicted probability of an above-limit payment falls by 0.38%. In 18 of the 62 cases in which physicians made payments, primary insurers paid less than the reported policy limits.
13.2%]).
Possible explanations for this pattern include eroded primary limits and coverage disputes.
Above-limit payments were made more often in perinatal cases, which account for 11% of all paid claims but for 26% of above-limit payments (16 of 62). A logit regression indicates that, controlling for ln(real policy limit) and ln(real payment size), above-limit payments were made more often in perinatal cases (OR=1.95; 95% CI=[1.093,3.488]). The real mean (median) payment for perinatal claims was $270,000
($120,000), compared to non-perinatal claims with real mean (median) payments of $160,000 ($40,000).
Although we do not attempt to explore the causes of above-limit payments, claims with these payments have certain prominent features, as shown in Table 4 . They are much larger on average than claims in general; they are more likely than claims in general to involve brain damage and infants; and they are less likely than claims in general to be death cases. These characteristics make sense. Larger claims are more likely to exceed policy limits, and brain damage and infant plaintiffs are known to correlate positively with payment size. By contrast, death is known to reduce payments relative to injuries requiring future medical care. 39 In logit regressions using the presence or absence of an above-limit payment as the binary dependent variable, all three variables had the agreements, which set upper and lower bounds on payments, appear not to have been used in any of these claims. Verdicts favoring plaintiffs were associated with payments above the policy limits as well. Table 5 reveals that doctors contributed to resolutions in 4.6% (9/196) of claims with pro-plaintiff verdicts, but the burden of these verdicts fell more heavily on primary insurers, which paid more than the limits 17.8% (35/196) of the time. At almost every verdict level, primary carriers were more likely to make above-limit payments than physicians and to pay larger amounts. In the 20 cases with the largest verdicts (>$5 million), doctors made one above-limit payments, while primary carriers paid more than the limits eight times. 40 [explain how we identify cases potentially involving high-low-agreements] Table 6 compares the verdict to the policy limit and examines physician payments in light of this relationship. In 91 cases with verdict-to-policy limit ratios > 1, physicians made seven above-limit payments (7.7%), and each payment was $200,000 or less. Although one might have suspected that the frequency of abovelimit payments would rise with the verdict-to-payment ratio (as a penalty imposed by the plaintiff for being grossly underinsured), this was not observed. In the 31 cases with the highest verdict-to-policy limit ratios (> 5), only one above-limit physician payment appears. The burden of under-insuring appears to fall mainly on plaintiffs, who collect declining percentages of verdicts as the ratio of verdict to policy limits rises. The statistics on above-limit payments in verdict cases discussed in this section reflect mainly cases with pro-plaintiff verdicts that ended with payments to claimants.
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Defense wins rarely appear in the TCCD because these cases usually end without payments. Studies typically find that defendants win 70-80% of medical malpractice trials. 42 Taking this into account, the estimated likelihood of a physician above-limit payment in a tried case (as opposed to a tried case that yielded a pro-plaintiff verdict) was about 1%. purchased from 1988 through 1999. 43 The discussions in this section are based on this subset of purchase years.
C. Primary Policy Size
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The conventional wisdom is that doctors buy medical malpractice policies with $1 million per occurrence limits. 45 The data do not support this belief. We find a median policy limit of $500,000 (nominal), which is constant during our sample period. Only 31% of the policies in our sample had $1 million limits, while 32% had nominal limits of $200,000 or less. Taking policies covering closed claims as a guide, it would be more accurate to say that the $1 million per occurrence policy is among the largest policies physicians are likely to purchase. Physicians with paid claims usually carried much less insurance. Table 7 shows the percentage of all paid claims covered by policies purchased 1988-1999 with the most common nominal limits-$100,000, $200,000, $500,000, $1 million, and $2 million. Ninety-two percent of primary policies purchased in these years fell into these five categories. Although policies with $1 million limits were the most common type, only about one-third of the policies reported were of this size, and few (6.1%) were larger. Policies with limits of $100,000, $200,000, and $500,000 were collectively more numerous than $1 million policies, being present in more than half the paid claim reports. The declining percentage of physicians with $100,000 nominal policies may suggest that doctors switched to larger policies over time. Alternatively, plaintiffs simply may have sued doctors with these policies less often. The data do not allow us to determine which phenomenon, if either, explains the observed pattern. Although perinatal physicians supposedly face claims with the greatest potential upward variation, they are less likely than other doctors to carry the largest insurance policies. Table 8 reports the results of claims-level regressions of ln(real policy limit) on purchase year. These regressions use reports for policies sold in all years . We address possible bias due to incomplete data for early and later purchase years by including years-to-close (closing year minus purchase year) as a separate independent variable. The coefficients on purchase year indicate statistically significant decreases in real limits over time for perinatal physicians, non-perinatal physicians and all physicians combined. We obtain similar results in regressions limited to purchase years 1988-1999.
Panel B of
D. Claim Frequencies and Total Payments
Given the findings that policy size declined and that policies seem to cap recoveries, one would suspect that total payments and claim frequencies also declined. In theory, both the likelihood of litigation and the payments plaintiffs recover might reflect the declining real dollars the insurance system makes available for compensation. We found that claim rates remained steady or declined over the period, while payments amounts remained stable. 
IV. DISCUSSION
Liability insurance provides the bulk of the currency with which medical malpractice claims are paid. For paid claims in the TCCD, primary carriers funded all but a small fraction of the dollars claimants received. The tendency of paid claims to stack up at the policy limits was striking as well: 13.6% of all paid claims had payment-to-limit ratios of 1, and claims with ratios exceeding 1 were uncommon regardless of policy size.
While policymakers debate the advisability of statutory caps on damages in medical malpractice cases, insurance policies appear to have imposed informal caps for years.
These de facto caps tightened as real policy size fell.
The tendency of claims to stack up at the policy limits may have several explanations. First, the difficulty of collecting from physicians may promote at-limit settlements of claims with high expected trial verdicts. Many doctors have limited assets or use asset protection strategies to insulate their wealth. 12 Even when unprotected assets exist, collection is costly 13 and professional norms discourage plaintiffs' attorneys from seeking to collect against them. 11 Second, claims with expected verdicts below the limits might settle at or near the limits because patients benefit from pressure exerted on insurers by physicians who want to avoid personal exposure by settling. The inverse relationship between policy limits and the magnitude of the spike (Figure 2 ) is consistent with both hypotheses.
The dominant role of primary insurers shows that the direct deterrent effect of malpractice liability is largely mediated through them, as they convert the judgment-and settlement-related costs of claims into premiums, monitor physicians' conduct, and evaluate physicians' insurability. Carriers absorb the impact of exceptionally high verdicts as well. Doctors made above-limit payments in only 1 of 31 cases with verdictto-limit ratios of 5 or higher (Table 6 ) and in only 1 of 20 cases with verdicts above $5 million (real). Although insurers and physicians gain the entire benefit when courts mistakenly send deserving plaintiffs home empty-handed, claimants capture only a fraction of awards that are unduly large. The larger the verdict, the smaller the percentage of the verdict a claimant collects.
The tendency of physicians involved in perinatal cases to have less coverage than other doctors also merits attention, given the larger average payment per perinatal claim and the higher frequency of above-limit payments. As shown, physicians with paid perinatal claims less often carried policies with limits above $1 million than other doctors. This could reflect the higher premiums physicians must pay for coverage of perinatal claims or insurers' reluctance to sell large policies on perinatal risks.
We have not explained why doctors buy the amounts of coverage they do. They may take guidance from other physicians, hospitals, managed care organizations, brokers, protection from liability risks. Such an inference would require a theory of optimal insurance purchasing or of optimal compensation for malpractice victims, neither of which we have developed. It would also require data on insurance purchases by physicians who did not incur paid malpractice claims, which we lack. For example, tolerance for risk is subjective. Even the remote danger of "financial disaster" that exists at current insurance levels might worry some physicians.
The nature of our dataset limits our ability to generalize from Texas' experience 
V. CONCLUSION
This study represents the first quantification of the degree to which insurance protects physicians from personal exposure from malpractice liability. Despite claims that all physicians are one lawsuit away from financial ruin, for claims closed [1990] [1991] [1992] [1993] [1994] [1995] [1996] [1997] [1998] [1999] [2000] [2001] [2002] [2003] policy limits seem to act as de facto caps on claimant recoveries and physicians rarely paid out of their own pockets to satisfy malpractice claims. In addition, the data do not support conventional wisdom that physicians purchase $1 million per occurrence coverage. Coverage among physicians with paid malpractice claims decreased over time, while claim rates and real payments remained fairly stable.
Given the observed low level of personal exposure to malpractice claims, liability would seem to have no deterrent effect unless its costs were transmitted to doctors through different routes (e.g., via the underwriting, pricing and monitoring practices of their insurers). While medical malpractice insurance has not been traditionally experience rated, the market seems to be moving in this direction. 52 Further study is needed to determine if the malpractice liability system serves its intended deterrent function.
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